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ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
Because Bright Failed To Argue, Much Less Show, That The Magistrate’s Interjected Comments 
During One Of Its Recitations Of The Jury Instructions On Reasonable Doubt Constituted 
Fundamental Error, He Was Not Entitled To Review Of This Unpreserved Issue Before The 
District Court On Intermediate Appeal 
 
At the close of voir dire, while reading the standard, presumptively correct instructions 
on reasonable doubt, the magistrate interjected the following comment:  “And, as I said 
yesterday, you didn’t check your common sense at the door.  Okay.  You’ve all broken up fights 
and arguments, you know how to do this.”  (Tr., p.73, Ls.13-16.)  Bright did not object to this 
interjected comment from the magistrate.  However, for the first time on intermediate appeal 
before the district court, Bright challenged the magistrate’s comment, asserting that it 
“denigrated not only the reasonable doubt standard and the burden placed on the state, but the 
criminal jury trial system, equating it to a neighborhood squabble.”  (R., p.325.) 
Because Bright failed to object to the magistrate’s comment (or raise this issue at any 
time before the trial court), as the state noted on intermediate appeal before the district court, the 
issue was unpreserved and Bright had to show fundamental error.  (R., p.350.)  Where an issue is 
unpreserved by timely objection,  
the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the alleged 
error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; 
(2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in 
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was 
a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless. 
 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010). 
Bright appears to acknowledge on appeal that, to be entitled to review of his unpreserved 
claim of “structural error,” he was required to show fundamental error.  (Respondent’s brief, 
pp.17-19.)  But even now he still has yet to attempt to show that his claimed constitutional 
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violation is clear on the record, instead just asserting that “[t]he error in this case was 
fundamental.”  (Respondent’s brief, p.19 (emphasis original).)  Bright’s naked assertion is not 
sufficient to show fundamental error; it does not show a clear constitutional violation on the 
record, nor does it show that his failure to object below was not for tactical purposes, such as 
sand-bagging.  Moreover, as shown by the state in its appellant’s brief and contrary to Bright’s 
assertions, he failed to show any reversible error in the magistrate’s comment, much less 
fundamental error.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-11.) 
Instead of attempting to show fundamental error, Bright claims in his Respondent’s brief 
that the state is asking this Court to apply an incorrect legal standard to the magistrate’s comment 
and that the correct test to apply is that articulated by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. 
Laramore, 145 Idaho 428, 179 P.3d 1084 (Ct. App. 2007).  (See Respondent’s brief, pp.11-14.)  
But the Court in Laramore articulated no test on the issue presented on this appeal—whether and 
in what circumstances a trial court’s comments on the jury instructions constitute error.  That is 
unsurprising as that was not the issue before the Court in Laramore.  Rather, the issue presented 
in that case was whether the trial court had erred when it adopted, over the objection of the 
defendant, its own instruction on reasonable doubt, which was then given to the jury. 
None of that happened in this case.  The magistrate did not create its own reasonable 
doubt instruction; it interjected an offhand comment in the middle of delivering the 
presumptively correct reasonable doubt instruction contained in I.C.J.I. 103.  (See Tr., p.73, 
Ls.3-21.)  The defendant raised no objection—at any time before the magistrate court—to this 
comment.  And the comment, though certainly spoken in front of the jury, was not then 
incorporated into the presumptively correct reasonable doubt instruction and given to the jury 
3 
with the official jury instructions.  (See R., pp.213-45.)  Whatever test may have been articulated 
by the Court in Laramore, assuming one was articulated, it is not applicable to this case. 
In fact, it appears that this issue of the propriety of a trial judge’s comments on the jury 
instructions is rarely raised on appeal.  There does not appear to be any case law from the state of 
Idaho directly addressing the issue.  However, at least one federal circuit court, the 10th Circuit 
in United States v. Olgin, 745 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1984), has addressed this specific issue and 
crafted a well-reasoned test that both can and should be applied to the issue in this case.  As 
shown in the state’s opening brief (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-9), application of that test shows no 
reversible error in the magistrate’s interjected comment, much less fundamental error entitling 
Bright to review of this unpreserved issue.  Throughout his Respondent’s brief, Bright presents 
no argument to the contrary. 
In its application of the correct legal test for comments made on the jury instructions, the 
state noted that (even in isolation), the magistrate’s comment on using common sense when 
deciding who to believe in a conflict aligned well with the United States Supreme Court’s 
discussion of moral evidence and moral certainty in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 10-13 
(1991).  (See Appellant’s brief, p.9.)  Bright asserts that the state failed to “cite to the correct 
portion of the [Supreme Court’s] decision” and that its “analysis does not follow the Supreme 
Court.”  (Respondent’s brief, p.15.)  Review of the relevant portion of Victor cited by the state 
demonstrates otherwise. 
In the companion case to Victor, Sandoval, the petitioner, had objected to the trial court’s 
use of the phrases “moral evidence” and “moral certainty” in its jury instruction on reasonable 
doubt.  Victor, 511 U.S. at 10.  The Supreme Court provided some historical background on 
these terms, quoting at length from a 1790 lecture given by James Wilson to explain that 
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“evidence … is divided into two species—demonstrative and moral….”  Id. (quoting 1 WORKS 
OF JAMES WILSON 518 (J. Andrews ed. 1896)).  “Moral evidence,” Wilson explained,  
has for its subject the real but contingent truths and connections which take place 
among things actually existing…. 
 
In moral evidence, there not only may be, but there generally is, contrariety of 
proofs....  With regard to moral evidence, there is, for the most part, real evidence 
on both sides.  On both sides, contrary presumptions, contrary testimonies, 
contrary experiences must be balanced. 
 
Id. at 10-11 (quoting 1 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON at 518-19).  The Supreme Court then went on 
to quote the observations of “[a] leading 19th century treatise” that “[m]atters of fact are proved 
by moral evidence alone; ... [i]n the ordinary affairs of life, we do not require demonstrative 
evidence, ... and to insist upon it would be unreasonable and absurd.”  Id. at 11 (quoting 1 S. 
Greenleaf, LAW OF EVIDENCE 3-4 (13th ed. 1876)). 
After showing how the terms “moral evidence” and “moral certainty” had previously 
been employed by the Supreme Court, the latter explicitly to mean “proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt,” the Court recognized “that the phrase ‘moral evidence’ is not a mainstay of the modern 
lexicon….”  Id. at 11-12.  However, the Court noted that the phrase’s meaning had not changed 
and that  
[t]he few contemporary dictionaries that define moral evidence do so consistently 
with its original meaning.  See, e.g., WEBSTER’S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY 
DICTIONARY 1168 (2d ed. 1979) (“based on general observation of people, etc. 
rather than on what is demonstrable”); COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1014 (3d 
ed. 1991) (similar); 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1070 (2d ed. 1989) (similar). 
 
Id. at 12-13.  Thus, the magistrate’s comment that the jurors were to use their common sense 
when determining reasonable doubt, as they would in any of the other “ordinary affairs of life,” 
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such as breaking up a fight or argument, is consistent with the Supreme Court’s observations on 
moral evidence offered in Victor. 
Bright also claims that “[t]he District Court correctly found that the [magistrate’s] 
comment was reasonably likely to affect the jurors’ decision.”  (Respondent’s brief, p.16.)  
Contrary to Bright’s assertion, it does not appear that the district court made any such finding in 
its “Order on Appeal.”  (See R., pp.371-72.)   
Finally, Bright claims that “the state attack[ed] the Respondent for failing to provide an 
appropriate record on appeal.”  (Respondent’s brief, p.19.)  Bright misunderstands.  The 
sufficiency of a record necessary to address an issue on appeal—that the record contain all 
relevant materials presented before the lower court—is distinct from the sufficiency of the record 
to show clear error on that record in the context of claims of fundamental error.  The state does 
not dispute that the record presented before the district court on intermediate appeal contained 
those things that were presented in the magistrate court relevant to a determination of the issues 
before it.  The record developed before the magistrate court, however, was deficient for the 
purpose of showing clear error because, while the magistrate clearly referenced some discussion 
from “yesterday” in its comment, what was encompassed in that discussion was never placed on 
the record.  Had an objection been raised before the magistrate, it is possible that such a record 
could have been developed.  However, no such objection was raised, and Bright cannot now 
demonstrate a constitutional violation that is clear on this incomplete record. 
As demonstrated in the state’s opening brief, and apparently conceded by Bright in 
response, because he failed to preserve his claim of structural error by raising any objection to 
the magistrate’s interjected comment, he was required to show fundamental error on appeal.  
Bright has never attempted to show that his claimed constitutional violation was clear on the 
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record.  He has never attempted to show that his lack of objection was not for a tactical purpose.  
He has failed to show fundamental error.  The district court erred on intermediate appeal when it 
failed to apply the correct legal standard of fundamental error to Bright’s unpreserved claim.  
Under any standard—and most especially under the correct standard of fundamental error—
Bright’s claim fails.  The district court’s opinion on intermediate appeal should therefore be 
reversed and the judgment of the magistrate court affirmed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the erroneous intermediate 
appellate decision of the district court and affirm Bright’s convictions for driving under the 
influence and possession of paraphernalia. 
 




      _/s/ Russell J. Spencer___________ 
      RUSSELL J. SPENCER 
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